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Beversluis: Values clarification and moral education

Are traditional
foundational
disciplines
adequate
to
the
educational
experiences
they
dividual
analyze?

Moral
education
and moral
choice

by George Dixon
The Ohio State University

A question of continuing importance for the foun.•
dations of education is whether the traditional loun·
dational discipli nes are adequate to the educational ex·
periences they help us analyze. Of course, this is not just a
concern ol educators; researchers in lo undational areas
are also led, at least occasionally, to ask how adequate
their methods are for thesis
analy
of human experience
generally. But the question seems more persistent and
bothersome for ed ucators who use the methods o f
philosophy and the social sciences to understand
ed ucational experiences. Somehow the greater need 10
connect theory with educational practice makes the
question or methodological adequacy more immediate for
the educational researcher. who can' t as easily push this
con.earn into the backg round or wait for another gen·
eratlon of research before translating theory into prac tice.
Certainly II is more c onvenient to push concern for
method into the backgro und and get o n with the researc h
at hand, for such problems are perennially troublesome
and usually tied into classical philosophical paradoxes
that defy quick resolution. One such paradox that is
especially troublesom e in education generally and parcular
ti
ly
in moral education is the In·
dividuallcollective relationship mentioned by Professor
Klohr in his essay " Emerging Foundations for Curriculum
Theory.'"
20
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Most people concerned with moral education are
lamillar with the Individual/collec
ve dilemma Inti
rerms of
two beliefs that seem to work in opposition to one
another. On the one hand, we assert that actions which
can be judged as moral or immoral necessarily
ve in·
Invol
choice. As moral agents, we can be neither
praised nor blamed If we have no degree of choice or con·
trol over our decisions and actions; one of the defining
charac teristics o r ac tions that we call "moral " Is just this
fac t of ind ividual responsibility. Ethical theories which
focus on this factor of individual responsibility and duty
share a Kantian emphasis on the formal aspects of moral
decisions.
But there is obviously more to moral decision than in·dual
d ivi
duty and private choice. We must also assert that
moral decisions are Influenced by circumstances outside
the individual, circumstances that are connected with the
time and place of choice, with specific rather than formal
factors, with the history of the individual as it is situated
between past experiences and expec tations for the future.
Moralists of the utilitarian persuasion wo uld, in fact,
calcu late just suc h factors to the point of explaining how
an individual is mos t likely to decide a moral question.
Their emphasis on the collective or social side of the
relationship aligns them rather clea
r ly with the methods
and emphasis of the social sciences. It is in this apparent
conflic t between Kantian or formalis
c ethical
ti
theories
and their utilitarian or naturalistic counterparts that we
find one source of difficulty for the moral educator con·
cerned wi th the foundations of his field.
For example, if the moral educator looks to
phi losophy to clarify this relat ionship between Individual
choice and social Influence, he finds that the problem
gets worse before It gets better. Philoso
phers In this cen·
tury, with a few notable exceptions, have regarded moral
decisions as matters of private preference and individual
feeling. They have preserved the necessarily Individual
aspect or morality, but only at the cost o f putting most
moral question s beyond reasonable discussion and public
evaluation. The resu lt for moral educators has too often
been one of reducing their task to helping students clarify
their individual values, and while this Is a worthy vocation,
it just begins to scratch the surface of the process of
moral choice and value formation. For such clarification
must Ignore the social nature o f moral ity; moral con·
sensus becomes li ttle more than the tabulation of private
interests. After individual value preferences have been
clarified , the teacher must indeed be ready to move on
quickly to the next topic of discussion; modern sub·
jectivls t theories o f morality
help
offer little
on the tough
issues that logi cally follow Individual clarification.
The moral educator can tu rn to the social sciences for
help in understanding how external factors condition
moral choice, for the social sciences seem to concentrate
on exactly those social or external factors that the values
clarification approach tends to ignore. But that s trength in
explaining how and why people choose and ac t as they do
comes to the social sciences at Its own high cost. For the
conclusion that seems implicit In most social science
research is that external lactors determine Individual
decisions and actions; the moral responsiblllty that
educators seek to enhance turns out to be an illusion.
puzzling
From a social science perspective, action s can be explained and even predicted, but In the c ourse of such
research we seem to remove the action ooing studied
from the realm of morality. That Is, we can hardly praise or
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blame a person for " having made a choice" if that person
has had a choice in the same way that Skinner's hen has
had an egg.'
So far in this analysis I have stretched the opposing
poles of the individual/collective paradox, si mplifying
each position and ignoring those developmen ts in
phi losophy and the social sciences which have worked to
mitigate the split. Unfortunately, such developments tend
to fall outside the mainstream of the various foundational
disciplines, so that it is usually Quite d ifficult for
educators to get in touch with them. This seems to me to
explain why those curriculum theorists c alled Recon·
ceptualists often look outside mainstream soc ial science
and sometimes to disciplines like literature and art for
red irection; they deliberately seek out researchers
working on the fringes or crossing discipl inary lines In or·
der to reconceptualize problems that have resisted
traditional solutions. Thus we might say that even though
some phi losophers and social scientists have begun to
address the individual/collective paradox and have un·
covered some promising directions for resolution, the
paradox is still very much with us. And it proves to be
especial
moral education, which has at its
ly deating Inbilit
center the problemat ic relationship between individual
choice and determining soc ial circumstances.
One philosopher and social theorist whose recent
work may be helpful to moral educators is Jurgen Habermas. For a variety of reasons, his work is not generally
known in this c ountry. although it is widely read in his own
country of Germany and th roughou t Europe.
Habermas' work is admittedly difficult, especially for
those with a phi losophical background in the Anglo·
American tradition of empiricism. Moreover, those works
by Habermas that have been translated into Eng lish for
the most part do not address educational questions di·
rectly. His most widely known work, Knowledge and Hu·
man Interests, is in fact a critique o f positivism. And the
education·oriented essays of Toward a Rational Society
focus on problems of the German educational system
during the 1960's and thus resist quick application to
educ ational problems in this country.
But perhaps it is this very foreignness that makes
Habermas· work significant to the problems o f ethical
theory and moral education . For with his philosoph ical
roots in Continental philosophy, especially in the works of
Hegel and Marx, Habermas has been able to bring new
light to the ind ividual/collective paradox that has defied so
many Anglo·American researchers. This is not to say that
Habermas avoids or rej ects philosophers and researchers
in our tradition; he has, in fact, been influenced by
philosophers as diverse as the American pragmatis t
Charles Sanders Peirce and the British analyst John L.
Austin. He is also conversant with social science research
from Max Weber to Jane Loevinger and Lawrence
Koh Iberg.
Jn fact the one translated essay by Habermas that
directly addresses the problem of educational foun·
datlons is a critique and reconstruction of Kohlberg' s
theory of cog nitive moral deve lopment.' That theory,
which has gained some popularity among moral
educators, posits six stages which form a hierarchy of
qualitative·distinct ways of deciding moral questions and,
thus, of guid ing moral action. On the basis of 20 years of
Investigation, Koh lberg has found that a child passes
through a number of discrete and invariant stages of moral
development, moving from an ego.centric basis for de·
FALL. 19i 8
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cision through a later adherence to social conventions
to a more reflective or " post·conventio
nal"
s tage. (See
Chart 1) As we might expect from Kohl berg's labels, most
people reach the th ird or fou rth stage of cognitive moral
development and remain there for most o f their lives. Only
a few, Socrates o r Jesus or Martin Luther King, for exam ·
pie, seem to attain the broad universal principles of Stage
Six.
On the basis of this theory, Kohlberg has developed
an approach to moral education that pushes students to
higher levels of moral development, primarily through the
use of ethical d ilemmas. Thus, a student at Stage Two is
presented in classroom discussion with a i ictional ethical
situation that demands a more comprehensive analysis
than is available within Stage Two reasoning. For exam.
pie, a student is asked to formulate a course of action for
an impoverished husband who is tempted to steal the ex·
pensive medicine his wife needs to survive. Such a fie·
tional situation hel ps the studen t to realize that individual
needs and desires may compete with or be over.ridden by
agreed·upon conventions. Kohlberg carefu lly sets up the
terms of each fictional dilemma so that the s tudent is
forced to look beyond his stage of moral development in order to arrive at a satisfactory resolution. The s tudent may
be forced to move from an egocentric Stage Two decision
to a Stage Three fear of punishment or towards a Stage
Four refusal to show disrespect for the laws against theft.
Confronting these dilemmas and examining possible
resolutions is supposed to foster the cognitive develop·
ment of students in relation to these ethical questions.
We shou Id note how Kohl berg defends this approach
from the twin dangers of indoctrination and subjectivism.
First, his approach concentrates on the form of the moral
judgment rather than the content; it also demands a
classroom atmosphere of d ialogue and mutual respect.
This emphasis on form and interaction among students
and teacher lessens the likelihood the teacher or the
student's peers will impose their moral decisions on the
individual s tudent and thereby deny him the opportunity
21
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social perspectives, beyond the limited connections now
made in Chart I.
So, as valuable as Kohlberg's research and inter·
prntations have been, we are still left with the unresolved dilemma of individual choice In a world that is un·
avoidably social. We have not been able to approach the
strict standard that Robert Paul Wolff sets forth in his
analysis of Kantian ethics:

to make his own moral choice . Secondly,
n·
Kohlberg co
tends that the greater c omprehensiveness of the latter
stages of his hierarchy provides an objective progression
In the structure If not in the co ntent of ethical judgments
and moral explanations. Thus the value neutrality or subjectivity of the values clarification approach, for example,
is replaced in Kohlberg's curriculum with a formal ob·
jectivity.
There is much more to Kohlberg's theory of moral
development, and much of it is helpful and convincing.
But one quick ly notices the Kantian emphasis in
Kohlberg's theory, especially as it focuses o n lhe
cognitive factors Invo
d lve in moral decisions and ac tio ns.
Kohlberg has indeed preserved individual choice through
the various s tages o f moral development, but seems to
Ig nore those factors that seem external and non·cognitive,
fac tors that have been analyzed in great detail by the
social sciences.
Kohl berg' s Justi fication tor proceeding in thi s manner
Is that the cognitive aspects of moral development are the
most important factor we have so far discovered. He
would admit that non.cognitive and utilitarian factors in·
fluence moral decisions, but he holds little hope for con·
necting inlernal and external factors, or individual and

... an adequate foundation for moral theory requires
some coherent way of understanding men's actions
both as causally determined, predic table, natural
events and as rationally initiated, pol Icy-directed ac·
lio ns. None o f the familiar dodges, relaxations of the
conflict, or reinterpretations designed to dissolve
the problem will do.... If any sense is to be made o f
responsibil ity and acllon, then one and the same bit
of behavior which can be explained physiologically,
pred icted statistically, and brought within the scope
of a scien tific theory must also be capable of being
consistently unders1ood as Issuing from the
autonomous aclion of practical reason.'
But this is precisely the challenge that Habermas
takes up in h is reconstruction of Kohlberg 's theory. He
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adds to the developmental psychology emphasis of
Kohlbilrg's work a sociolog ical dimension, one that
relates the six stages to the process of socialization. By
thus drawing on the work of George Herbert Mead and
Talcott Parsons, among others, Habermas moves
Kohlberg's theory lrom a monologic basis to a dialogic
basis. Another way to describe Habermas' direction is in
terms of the social contrac t theory that underlies so much
of our social and politica
l
thought. Habermas would pose
two questions of the fami liar social contract theory that
has its counterpart in Kohlberg's Fifth Stage: 1) How do
moral agents entering into a social contrac t become
responsible agen ts in the first place? and 2) How do the Interests o f Individuals combine to constitute universal prln·
ciples, thal Is, how are ethical universals formed?
From a his torical perspective, both questions can be
traced back to Hegel's critique of Kantian ethics. Both
point to the weakness in Kohlberg's theory, and in for·
malistic ethics generally, namely, their static and In·
dividualistlc foundation. But what is most important here
is that Habermas calls our attention to the dynamic and
social nature of moral development. He brings to
Kohlberg's theory much-needed sociological insights Into
how we become aware of ourselves as agents acting In the
world, into how we come to see the interaction of in·
tent ions and consequences in our actions, and of how we
gradually recognize norms and the conditions for apply Ing
those norms to our decisions and ac tions.
Once again we must note that Habermas' recon·
struc tion Is a detailed and complicated critique, as one
can see from the various columns in Chart II. But hi s
broadening of Kohlberg's base gives moral educalors a
better theoretical foundation for their work in schools, one
that moves beyond a static conception of already-formed
individuals align ing themselves with already·es tablished
principles or stages. As a result, a s tudent's
question about why he can't follow hi s private value
position and cheat on the next test need no t create a crisis
In the moral education curriculum. In fact, from Haber.
mas' perspective, such a question would provide the opportunity to consider a number of important ethical
Issues. Rather than avoid the issue, a teacher could ad·
vance the discussion by asking the student to consider
the nature of conventional classroom rules against
cheating, the tension that usually exists between private
Interest and social welfare, and the role that the teacher
often fulfills In the classroom as enforcer of society's
rules and regulations.
ly,
Admitted these topics may prove hazardous for the
moral educato r. In the first place, the teacher's own role Is
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likely to come under the scru tiny o f his students. Sec·
ondly, these topics are sure to provide the teacher with more
puzzling moments than are likely to occur within the supposedly neutral values clarification curriculum. The
teacher might even find that simple questions, like those
abOut cheating, lead finally to d iscussions concerned with
things like the function of testing In the schools, a topic
that seems complex no matter how advanced one's stage
of cognitive development.
Th is last example points, however, to an additional
benefit of Habermas' approach. That is, Habermas is able
to posit a Seventh Stage of moral development, one that
moves beyond a Kantian base in universalized duty to a
basis in moral and political freedom. This base is dialogic
and social rather than monologlc and subjective. At th is
stage, we have more than the formal goal of Stage Six to
serve as an end point for our theory o f moral development.
we can now consider the conseq uences as well as the
form of our moral deliberations, we can take into account
factors like human needs and welfare, and we can finally
add a certain degree of content and specificity to ethical
theory and moral education.
To sum up, we might say that Habermas wants to con·
sider social and external factors without reducing ethics
to a utilitarian calculation; at the same time, he wants to
preserve individual choice without adopting the ab·
stractness of ethical formalism. His efforts certainly need
greater development and application, but they do offer us
a view of moral education that avoids the subjective and
inconsequential flavor of so much o f what passes as
moral education. In contras t, Habermas' reconstruc tion
provides a basis for taking moral education serio
usly.
It
not only offers us a compell ing explanation of the in ·
terac tive nature o f ethical un iversals and the interplay be·
tween individual autonomy and soc ial constraints, but it
accounts for those conditions that surround moral
education and ultimately moral choice.
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